

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 171103Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY SANAA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2739

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USCINCEUR

SECDEF WASHDC

DA WASHDC

S E C R E T SANAA 1833

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, YE, US, TC

SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS FOR YAR

SECDEF FOR ISA AND DSAA

REF: STATE 169859

1. SUMMARY: YAR PRESSED FOR PROMPT DECISION ON AIR/SEA DELIVERY OF ARMS PACKAGE AND SHOULDERING MORE OF THE DIPLOMATIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF COORDINATION WITH FRIENDS. URGES RECONSIDERATION OF LONG DELIVERY ON RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS. IS SENDING CHIEF OF STAFF TO SAUDI ARABIA TO TRY TO BREAK LOOSE SAG ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IN F-5 TRAINING.

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTTEL, CHARGE NEWTON HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH YARG TO GET AGREEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF MIX BETWEEN SEA AND AIR FREIGHT, TRIPODS FOR 30 CALIBER

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MG. JUST BEFORE MY RETURN HE HAD OBTAINED REPLY THAT

TRIPODS NEEDED BECAUSE IN SOME INSTANCES YAR MILITARY INTEND USE 30 CALIBER MG IN STATIC POSITIONS. WITH NEWTON, YARG CAME BACK STRONGLY ON QUESTIONS OF LONG DELIVERY TIMES FOR 106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES AND AMMO (15-16 MONTHS), TRIPODS (6 MONTHS), AND 81MM MORTARS (18 MONTHS). OUR MOST SYMPATHETIC CONTACTS BOTH ON CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SIDE SAID THEY COULD NOT COMPREHEND HOW A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THE SIZE OF US COULD NOT SOMEHOW FIND WAY TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE TO A FRIENDLY COUNTRY IN SUCH CRITICAL SITUATION AS NORTH YEMEN 50 RECOILLESS RIFLES AND 10 MORTARS OF A STANDARD TYPE IN USE BY US AND ITS ALLIED FORCES AROUND THE WORLD.

3. FOLLOWING NEWTON CONVERSATIONS, YARG, ON PRESIDENT'S RETURN, WENT INTO ONE OF ITS PERIODS OF NON-STOP INTERNAL CONSULTATION, POLITICKING, AND RECONCILIATION, ETC., MOST OF THIS TAKING PLACE IN TAIZ. IT WAS NOT UNTIL SEPTEMBER 15 THAT ACTING FONMIN ASNAG RETURNED TO SANAA. NEWTON AND I CALLED FOR TOUR D'HORIZON SEPTEMBER 16. (OTHER ASPECTS SEPTELS.)

4. REVIEW STATUS OF YARG'S EFFORT OBTAIN EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO MEET CURRENTLY ACTIVE THREAT POSED BY SABOTAGE GROUPS OPERATING FROM SOUTH AND MORE DISTANT POSSIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ATTACK FROM PDRY, I NOTED THAT TWO JORDANIAN DELIVERIES HAD BEEN RECEIVED, ONE BY AIR AND ONE BY SEA: 32 SALADINS, TO BE DELIVERED GRATIS THANKS TO ABU DHABI, AND ACCOMPANIED BY JORDANIAN TRAINING TEAM, SHOULD BE ARRIVING AT ANY MOMENT. FROM MY OWN RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN, I NOTED, GOJ APPEARS TO BE THINKING WITH EQUAL POSITIVISM ABOUT LONGER TERM ASSISTANCE, DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD BE COMMUNICATED BY JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR MUSTAFA UPON RETURN LATER IN THE MONTH.

5. AS REGARDS US EMERGENCY PACKAGE, THROUGH SAG AND ABU DHABI-FINANCED, I SAID THERE CURRENTLY DELAY DUE ABSENCE OF SHAIKH ZAYID. ALSO, YARG HAD NOT ANSWERED DEFINITELY ON OUR SUGGESTION OF SOME TRANSPORTATION BY AIR AND SOME BY SEA. LASTLY, YARG, HAD NOT SHOULDERS

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THE PRIMARY DIPLOMATIC ROLE WITH ADG, AS WE HAD REQUESTED. YAR AMBASSADOR TO UAE, QUBATI, WHILE FULLY BRIEFED AND PREPARED CONCLUDE DEALINGS WITH ADG, STILL IN SANAA. ADMITTEDLY, SHAIKH ZAYID REMAINED ABSENT, BUT WDSUNDERSTOOD PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE WITH MINSTATE HABROUSH.

6. ASNAG APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN GETTING FINAL DECI-

SION ON AIR AND SEA TRANSPORTATION. MILITARY PREFERENCE WAS TO HAVE EVERYTHING COME BY AIR. HOWEVER, HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT THAT ADG LIKELY FEEL BETTER ABOUT THIS OPERATION IF IT SATISFIED YARG HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT MINIMIZE COSTS. ASNAG PROMISED GO BACK TO MILITARY LEADERS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE IN EFFORT PERSUADE THEM ON MERITS OF US SUGGESTION.

7. ASNAG ASKED IF WE COULD NOT APPEAL WASHINGTON POSITION ON DELIVERY TIME FOR THE 30 106 RECOILLESS RIFLES AND 10 81MM MORTARS, WHICH MILITARY FELT WERE AMONG ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY NEEDS. I SAID I WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE.

8. ON OUR COMPLAINT THAT YARG NOT CARRYING ENOUGH OF THE DIPLOMATIC LOAD IN THIS MATTER, ASNAG SAID HE WOULD TRY TO LEVER QUBATI OUT OF SANAA AND BACK TO ABU DHABI SOONEST, ALTHOUGH UPCOMING HOLIDAYS AND ZAYID'S CONTINUED ABSENCE MIGHT NOT MAKE THIS EASY. ON ANOTHER FRONT, HOWEVER, CHIEF OF STAFF MASWARI LEAVING SEPTEMBER 17 FOR SAUDI ARABIA FOR FULL REVIEW OF PROSPECTIVE SAUDI ASSISTANCE. ASNAG SAID HE HAD NO CONFIDENCE SAG PREPARED TO MOVE, BUT IT STILL SERVED SOME PURPOSE TO KEEP KNOCKING AT THE DOOR. IN PARTICULAR, MASWARI WILL PRESS SAUDIS ON ADMITTING SOME YEMENIS TO F-5 PILOT AND GROUND TRAINING SINCE, WITH IRANIANS' NEGATIVE ANSWER ON PILOT AS OPPOSED TO GROUND) TRAINING, THIS SEEMS YAR'S ONLY OPENING IN ITS EFFORT GET STARTED ON A MODEST AIR FORCE.

9. I COMMENDED ASNAG ON YAR DECISION TO KEEP AFTER THE SAUDIS ON ITS OWN. ON VISIONS OF A FUTURE AIR FORCE, I URGED YARG KEEP ITS SIGHTS LOW. WHILE IRAN AND SAUDIA ARABIA MIGHT BE PERSUADED SUPPORT CREATION OF AN
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F-5-BASED AIR FORCE, YARG WOULD DO WELL TO KEEP IN MIND THE PROBLEM OF ONGOING COSTS IN LIGHT ITS CHRONICALLY DEFICIT BUDGET POSITIONED IN GENERALLY FRAIL ECONOMY.

10. COMMENT: MASWARI TRIP SHOULD TAKE CARE OF OUR EARLIER RECOMMENDATION THAT YARG BRIEF SAG ON STATUS OF ITS DEALINGS WITH IRANIANS ON F-5 TRAINING.

11. IF, AS WE HOPE, WE RECEWVE YAR'S EARLY AGREEMENT TO RECOMMENDATION ON COMBINATION OF AIR AND SEA TRANSPORT, I WOULD URGE THAT QUESTION OF DELIVERY DATE ON 106S AND 81MM MORTARS BE REVIEWED. ON FORMER, COULD WE NOT SPARE MODEST NUMBER OF 30 FROM US STOCKS SOMEWHERE. IF 106S CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE SOONER, YARG WOULD WISH

HAVE AT LEAST SOME WITH AMMO, AIRLIFTED. WE REGARD THIS AS
REASONABLE. PERHAPS SAVINGS ON OCEAN FREIGHT OF
SOME OTHER AMMO (PARA 8 REFTTEL) COULD BE APPLIED
MEET EXTRA COST. RE 81MM, WOULD APPRECIATE JIDDA'S
REACTION TO DEPARTMENT QUERY REFTTEL RE POSSIBILITY OF
SUGGESTING TO SAG THAT IT DIVERT 10 MORTARS FROM
EXPECTED FY 74 SECOND QUARTER DELIVERY OF 150. SAG WILLINGNESS
HELP OUT IN THIS VERY MODEST RESPECT ON WHICH US HAVING
DIFFICULT WOULD BE WELL
RECEIVED HERE.
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